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Annotation
The object of the study is provided by the conflict of interests of the Ukrainian society
and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-(MP) against the
backdrop of the 2022 full-scale Russian war against Ukraine. The article considers the impact
of new legislative initiatives aimed at minimizing the destructive Russian influence, including
on the religious area. The main content and contradictions of certain points of the Decree of
the Council of the UOC (MP) dated May 27, 2022, as a result of which the religious
denomination declared independence from the Moscow Patriarchate, are analyzed. The main
reasons for the rejection of the Moscow Patriarchate by the UOC and their influence on the
decisions of church leaders are identified. Also included are the independent decisions of more
than 400 UOC parishes to transfer to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. In the context of
illustrating the reasons for the refusal and contradictions, certain facts of the destruction by the
Russian army of churches in Ukraine subordinate to the UOC-MP (friendly fire) are pointed
out. This study is aimed at establishing the motives, results, and consequences of rethinking
the subordination of one's own religious activity to a denomination that, despite its dependence
on the Moscow Patriarchate, is actively functioning in Ukraine during the ongoing RussianUkrainian war.
Key Words: The Orthodox Church of Ukraine, the ideology of the Moscow Patriarchate, the
religious confrontation between Ukraine and Russia, the reasons for Ukraine's rejection of the
Russian Patriarchate.
Formulation of the Problem
On May 27, the 93rd day of Russia’s war against Ukraine, a Council of the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) was held to deal with the issues of
“church life that arose as a result of the military aggression of the Russian Federation against
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Ukraine.” 1 As a result, a number of conceptual theses were adopted, interpreting the church's
attitude toward the war in Ukraine, the issues of patronage of the Moscow Patriarchate, the
organization's vision of its own independence, etc. This event is due to a wide public outcry,
which is the result of a conflict of interests caused by activities of a religious denomination in
Ukraine in the context of the current war with Russia. However, some decisions from the
resolution seem contradictory, the causal relationships of which should be considered in detail.
The issue of an organization subordinated to Moscow functioning in Ukraine and the reasons
for the separation of the UOC from the Moscow Patriarchate require a separate study in order
to establish complex causations, as well as the motives, results, and consequences for society
due to such declarative decisions of the UOC-MP against the backdrop of the current war in
Ukraine.
Analysis of Recent Publications
The issue of the causes and consequences of the separation or transition of the UOCMP from the Moscow Patriarchate has so far been only indirectly studied in the context of
related thematic areas, because in the pre-war period there were no such rapid tendencies in
this regard. However, the works of scholars who have studied related issues indicate the
appearance of preliminary symptoms of this phenomenon. For example, S. Kahamlik notes that
“Russia's military and ideological aggression has become a marker of the social identity and
civilizational choice for Christian denominations.” The author defines the role of the UOC-MP
as “a structural part of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC).” 2 This indicates that scholars
were aware of the signs of ideological and socio-cultural bias, which spread through
confessional channels. A. Kiridon points to “the changes that confessional identity undergoes
depending on political and social events.” According to her, “the inter-Orthodox confrontation
in Ukraine has not only not disappeared, but has become even more aggravated, given the
multidimensional jurisdictional status of Ukrainian Orthodoxy.” 3 M. Gordieno quite rightly
“Постанова Собору Української Православної Церкви від 27 травня 2022 року,” Українська Православна
Церква, 2022, https://news.church.ua/2022/05/27/postanova-soboru-ukrajinskoji-pravoslavnoji-cerkvi-vid-27travnya-2022-roku. ["Resolution of the Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church dated May 27, 2022,"
Ukrainian Orthodox Church, 2022,]
2
С. Кагамлик, “Церква в Україні в умовах сучасних загроз: реакція на Російську військову агресію,”
Українознавчий альманах, no. 29 (2021): 82. [S. Kagamlyk, "Church in Ukraine under conditions of modern
threats: reaction to Russian military aggression," Ukrainian Studies Almanac, no. 29 (2021): 82.]
3
Алла Киридон, “Релігійно-конфесійна ідентичність: динаміка процесів у православному просторі
України (2018-2021),” in Актуальні проблеми сучасної філософії та науки: виклики сьогодення (Житомир:
Видавець О.О. Євенок, 2021), 38. [Alla Kyridon, "Religious-denominational identity: dynamics of processes in
the Orthodox space of Ukraine (2018-2021)," in Current problems of modern philosophy and science: challenges
of today (Zhytomyr: Publisher O.O. Evenok, 2021), 38.]
1
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believes that some “reasons for not moving from the UOC-MP can be divided into emotional
and logical.” 4 However, these two categories lack a specific definition as far as the root of this
decision. The issue is a powerful information campaign, which the aggressor country has long
been methodically promoting in the Ukrainian religious sphere. I. Solyar and A. Krasivsky note
that “the Russian-Ukrainian war has become one of the factors that forced the society to
overestimate the importance of the church in the process of the national-patriotic awareness of
the people (with a corresponding reflection in the political plane).” 5 However, scholars do not
focus on the variations and factors of such a social and confessional reassessment towards the
functioning of the UOC-MP in Ukraine. Foreign scholars M. Ohle, R. Cook, S. Jovanović, and
Z. Han concluded that “Russia manipulated the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and used it
as part of what can be described as a dynamic offensive of soft power acting in its interests.”
They note that this kind of information campaign “is aimed at reconciling the interests of
potential subordinates with the interests of Moscow through the Christian Orthodox Church.”6
Here the authors aptly connect the ROC with the levers of global influence in Ukraine 7: that,
first of all, it is about the UOC-MP. Similar theses are supplemented by C. Beggs, stating that
“Christianity in political discourse and government policy in Russia after 1991 acts as part of
the formation of the country's national identity. This has led to the fact that the ROC has
acquired the notable significance of a privileged position in Russian society.” And additionally,
there are “contradictory involvements in the latest military conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine.” 8
The above analysis of recent publications contextually involved in the stated problem
demonstrates the general focus of scholars regarding this phenomenon. However, the reasons
for the separation of the UOC from the Moscow Patriarchate have not yet been
comprehensively investigated. The purpose of this study is to identify and study the derivative
causes and motives for the declaration of independence of the UOC from the Moscow
Patriarchate.
М. Гордієнко, “Причини непереходу вірян УПЦ (МП) до ПЦУ” (Кваліфікаційна робота бакалавра, наук,
2021), 10. [M. Gordienko, "Reasons for non-transfer of believers of the UOC (MP) to the OCU" (Bachelor's
qualification thesis, sciences, 2021), 10.]
5
І. Соляр and О. Красівський, “Трансформація державно-церковних відносин в Україні (1989 – 2021),”
Izdevnieciba Baltija Publishing, 2021, 52–84, doi:10.30525/978-9934-26-211-1-3. [I. Solyar and O. Krasivskyi,
"Transformation of state-church relations in Ukraine (1989 - 2021)," Izdevnieciba Baltija Publishing, 2021, 52–
84,]
6
M. Ohle et al., “Russia’s Architecture of Hegemony,” : Christian Orthodox Subordination Strategies in Russia’s
Peripheral Zone. Europe-Asia Studies 74, no. 3 (2022): 382–401.
7
Kilp, Alar and Pankhurst, Jerry G. (2022) "Soft, Sharp, and Evil Power: The Russian Orthodox Church in the
Russian Invasion of Ukraine," Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe: Vol. 42, Iss. 5, Article 2.
4

8
C. Beggs, “Soft Power, Hard Times: Russian Influence in the Post-Soviet Space during Periods of Military
Conflict” (A dissertation submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, 2021), 33.
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Central Argument of the Article
The Russian war on Ukraine, which began in 2014, became a catalyst for the changes
that have taken place with Ukrainian Orthodoxy since 2018 and that are taking place now. The
general trend indicates a transitional stage of the social paradigm in the direction opposite the
course of Russian ideology. Ukrainians and Russians both have communities of related
religions among them. However, the differences between the Orthodox Church of Ukraine
(OCU) and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) are
fundamental; see more about it in the preliminary study published in OPREE. 9 In short, the
UOC-MP is by all indications a Ukrainian branch of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC).
Against this background, with the start of a full-scale war by Russia against Ukraine in 2022,
claims from Ukrainian society regarding non-religious subversive activities by Russia within
Ukraine began to be actively expressed against this religious denomination. On March 5, 2022,
in the interests of the national security of Ukraine, “The Draft Law on Amendments to Certain
Legislative Acts of Ukraine on the Prohibition of Political Parties” was adopted. The
explanatory note of the law refers to “prohibiting the activities of such political parties that
carry out anti-Ukrainian activities or promote collaborationism,” expressing the idea that such
restrictions “will be an effective means of protecting democracy in Ukraine and its
independence and sovereignty.” 10 This step is natural during the active stage of the war with
Russia. Further, based on this law, “ten pro-Russian political parties were banned in court, and
seven additional remain in line.” 11 These and other steps are aimed at limiting the internal
subversive anti-Ukrainian activities that Russia has been deliberately implementing for a long
time. Obviously, the political sphere of influence is not the sole player in this struggle. The
cultural realm is no less important. Therefore, it did not take long to “restrict the public use of
the musical product of the aggressor state,” 12 and “renaming city objects whose names are
B. Synchak, M. Balaklytskyi, and V. Dudarets, “Non-Religious Influence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of
the Moscow Patriarchate on Ukrainian Society,” Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe 42, no. 4
(2022): 47–60.
10
“Проект Закону про внесення змін до деяких законодавчих актів України щодо заборони політичних
партій,” Верховна Рада України, 2022, https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/39307. ["Draft of the Law on
Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine Regarding the Prohibition of Political Parties," Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine, 2022,]
11
“В Україні заборонили вже 10 проросійських партій, на черзі є ще сім – Мін’юст,” Радіо Свобода, 2022,
https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-ukraina-zaborona-10-prorosiiski-partii/31908143.html. ["10 pro-Russian
parties have already been banned in Ukraine, seven more are on the way - Ministry of Justice," Radio Svoboda,
2022,]
12
“Проект Закону про внесення змін до деяких законів України щодо підтримки національного музичного
продукту та обмеження публічного використання музичного продукту держави-агресора 7273-д від
29.05.2022,” Верховна Рада України, 2022, https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/39702. ["Draft of the Law
9
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associated with the Russian Federation and its satellites,” for which more than 6.5 million
Ukrainians voted. 13 An equally significant degree of restriction of Russian influence in Ukraine
is happening in the religious field, in particular through the revision of the legality of the free
activity of the UOC, which is directly subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate. Numerous
parishes (over 400) of this church organization have already arbitrarily transferred their
subordination to the OCU. In response to this process, the UOC-MP organized a council at
which the leaders of the organization declared their independence from Russian subjugation
and condemned the war. To establish the reasons for the rupture of the UOC from the MP, it is
necessary to consider in detail certain points of this resolution that cause conflict (see Table 1).
Table 1. The main content and contradictions of individual paragraphs of the Decree of
the Council of the UOC (MP) dated May 27, 2022 14
№
1

Decrees

Contradictions

“The council condemns war as a Nowhere in the Decree does it say what kind of
violation of God's commandment war the UOC condemns. There is no clear
‘Thou shalt not kill!’ (Ex. 20:13) gradation for the Russian-Ukrainian war
and expresses condolences to all initiated by the Russian Federation and the war
who suffered in the war.”

2

“The

Council

appeals

in general.
to

the Only the exit of the Russian military from the

authorities of Ukraine and the territories of an independent state would “stop
authorities of the Russian Federation the bloodshed.” Therefore, this statement is
with a request to continue the more speculative than practical. However, we
negotiation process and the search are well aware that the above presentation may
for a strong and reasonable word not be entirely accurate; bloodshed can also end
that could stop the bloodshed.”

by the total capitulation of one of the parties at
war, or even by a negotiated peace.

on Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine Regarding the Support of the National Musical Product and
Restriction of the Public Use of the Musical Product of the Aggressor State 7273-d dated 05/29/2022," Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine, 2022,]
13
“Понад 6,5 мільйонів голосів громадяни України віддали в рейтинговому електронному голосуванні
щодо перейменувань міських об’єктів, назви яких пов’язані з російською федерацією та її сателітами,”
Київська міська рада, 2022, https://kmr.gov.ua/uk/content/ponad-65-milyoniv-golosiv-gromadyany-ukrayinyviddaly-v-reytyngovomu-elektronnomu. ["Over 6.5 million votes were cast by the citizens of Ukraine in the rating
electronic voting regarding the renaming of city objects, the names of which are associated with the Russian
Federation and its satellites," Kyiv City Council, 2022,]
14
“Постанова Собору Української Православної Церкви від 27 травня 2022 року,” Українська Православна
Церква, 2022, https://news.church.ua/2022/05/27/postanova-soboru-ukrajinskoji-pravoslavnoji-cerkvi-vid-27travnya-2022-roku. ["Resolution of the Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church dated May 27, 2022,"
Ukrainian Orthodox Church, 2022,]

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (SEPTEMBER 2022) XLII, 7

28

3

“We express our disagreement with To express disagreement, antitheses must be
the position of Patriarch Kirill of contrasted and substantiated. They are not
Moscow and All Russia regarding obviously presented
the war in Ukraine.”

here for ideological

reasons. However, in the midst of intertwining
emotions, deaths, losses, and a variety of
primary and vital causes, better and more
objective perspective may be more possible in
the future.

4

The Council adopted appropriate These adjustments have already been labeled
additions and amendments to the "cosmetic" by niche media. The new statute
Statute on the Administration of the may have legally separated the Ukrainian
Ukrainian

Orthodox

testifying

to

the

Church, Orthodox

Church

from

the

Moscow

complete Patriarchate, but in spirit it has not changed

independence of the Ukrainian anything significant. 15 However, the former
Orthodox Church.

canonical submission of UOC-MP is radically
different

from

the

newly

declared

independence, which is an expression of the
national spirit and the desire to completely
separate oneself from those who hurt the whole
nation.
5

“The Orthodox Church cannot leave According to the religious scholar Y. Kotsyuba,
her faithful without spiritual care, such a decision is “pro-Moscow,” because “the
she must stand by their side in their majority of Ukrainian citizens left for the
trials

and

organize

church countries of Western and Eastern Europe, which

communities in the Diaspora. It is are the canonical territories of autocephalous
necessary to further develop the churches:

Polish,

Bulgarian,

Romanian,

mission abroad among Orthodox Constantinopolitan, and others.” That is, it can
Ukrainians in order to preserve their be interpreted as the expansion of Russian
faith,

culture,

language

and spheres of influence on the West.

Orthodox identity.” And at the same
time, it should be added that now no
“Косметичні зміни. З’явився текст нового статуту УПЦ МП,” Релігійна правда, 2022,
https://religionpravda.com.ua/?p=82497. ["Cosmetic changes. The text of the new statute of the UOC MP
appeared," Religious Truth, 2022,]
15
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one can force believers to do
anything without their consent. No
one can force Ukrainians in exile to
attend this or that church.
6

“Realizing its special responsibility Any religious denomination is responsible not
before God, the Council expresses only to God, but also to society. In fact, this
deep concern for the lack of unity in paragraph

directly

Ukrainian Orthodoxy.” ... “The narratives

about

duplicates
the

“Moscow’s

‘illegality’

of

the

recent actions of the Patriarch of autocephaly of the OCU, granted by the
Constantinople in Ukraine, which Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew.”10 The
resulted in the formation of the irony of these theses lies in the fact that it is
«Orthodox Church of Ukraine», precisely such non-recognition that causes
only aggravated misunderstandings public
and led to physical confrontation.”

misunderstanding

and

opposition.

However, when people die and a country is
destroyed daily in front of its citizens, the
interests of society play a very strong role.
Today, Ukrainian society wants peace and
tranquility at any cost, but not at the cost of
losing its identity and freedom.

7

In order for the dialogue to take Recall the presumption of innocence when it
place, the OCU representatives need comes to accusations of force and coercion.
to:

According to the speaker of the OCU,

- stop forcible seizures of churches Archbishop of Chernigov and Nizhyn, E. Zarya,
and forced transfers of parishes of as of the end of May, “since the Russian
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

invasion, the UOC-MP more than 400 parishes

- realize that their canonical status, have departed.” 16 The statement about the need
as it is fixed in the “Charter of the to rethink ideological positions based on
Orthodox Church of Ukraine,” is in documented
fact

non-autocephalous

and

generally

recognized

and documents (Tomos on autocephaly of the OCU,

significantly inferior to the freedoms 2019) is nothing more than a repetition of
and

opportunities

in

the Kremlin narratives that do not recognize the

“З моменту вторгнення Росії УПЦ МП покинули понад 400 парафій. BBC News Україна,” BBC News
Україна, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/news-61549903. ["Since the invasion of Russia, more than 400
parishes have left the UOC-MP. BBC News Ukraine," BBC News Ukraine, 2022,]
16
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implementation of church activities, identity of the Ukrainian religious persuasion.
which are provided for by the Thus, this provision declares the “desire for
Charter on the management of the dialogue,” while not offering any compromises
Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

or concessions, which is typical only for an

- resolve the issue of the canonicity ultimatum position.
of the OCU hierarchy, because, for
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, as
well as for most Local Orthodox
Churches, it is quite obvious that, in
order to recognize the canonicity of
the OCU hierarchy, it is necessary to
restore the apostolic succession of
its bishops.
8

The Council lifts a prayer of Between the lines of this paragraph, one can see
thanksgiving to the Merciful Lord the repetition of another Russian narrative about
for the opportunity of fraternal “fraternal peoples,” and the only religious plane
communion and expresses hope for for Russians and Ukrainians. This contradicts
an end to the war and reconciliation the real state of affairs. References to the words
of the warring. According to the of John the Theologian about “truth and love”
holy apostle and evangelist John the are also quite ironic against the background of
Theologian, may there be “grace, that Russian propaganda, which has nothing to
mercy and peace from God the do with the truth, and even more so the hatred
Father and from the Lord Jesus of Ukrainians.
Christ, the Son of the Father, in truth
and love” (2 Jn. 1:3).
Table 1 conveys the quintessence, the main content of those definitions that should

testify to the independence of the UOC from the MP. However, the contradictions that arise
during a detailed consideration of certain provisions indicate the formality of this procedure,
because, in terms of ideological connotation, declarative independence from the MP does not
change the pro-Russian vector of the essence of the activities of the UOC-MP. Thus, such
statements cannot be considered a serious revision of the ideology that is destructive for
Ukrainian statehood, which brings only Russian terror to Ukrainians. Consideration of the
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immediate reasons prompting the UOC-MP to such legal and cosmetic decisions is the next
necessary element to establish the motives and consequences of the formal separation of the
UOC-MP from the MP (see Fig. 1).
Obvious
Russian terror

• Full-scale invasion of
Ukraine (mass killings
of civilians)

Outrage of the
Ukrainian public

• The final rejection of the
Russian patriarchate in
Ukraine
The actual
independent
transition of
communities to
the OCU

•

• Legal “examination” of its charter
in order not to fall under probable
prohibitions

• Numerous initiatives to
independently refuse to
submit to the Russian
patriarchy
Legislative
decisions
prohibiting proRussian activities

Figure 1. The main reasons for the separation of the UOC from the Moscow
Patriarchate
Figure 1 shows the main reasons for the departure of the UOC from the Moscow
Patriarchate. The first criterion is an argument that cannot be ignored, because, according to
the Office of the Prosecutor General alone, during the first 100 days of a full-scale war in
Ukraine, more than 22,500 crimes committed by Russians on Ukrainian soil were registered.
In particular, of these were “1037 for high treason, 923 for collaboration activities, and 36 for
complicity with the aggressor state,” 17 among which there are some committed by persons
involved in the UOC-MP. Such aggressive activities of Russia against Ukraine cannot but
cause a conflict of interest related to the subordination of a religious denomination to the
Moscow Patriarch Kirill, who publicly blesses the Russian military for the war in Ukraine and
supports chauvinistic Russian narratives regarding the non-recognition of Ukrainian identity. 18

“За сто днів повномасштабної війни в Україні правоохоронці зафіксували понад 22,5 тисячі злочинів,
які вчинили росіяни,” ZMINA, 2022, https://zmina.info/news/za-sto-dniv-povnomasshtabnoyi-vijny-v-ukrayinipravoohoronczi-zafiksuvaly-majzhe-23-tysyachi-zlochyniv-yaki-vchynyly-rosiyany/. ["For one hundred days of
full-scale war in Ukraine, law enforcement officers recorded more than 22,500 crimes committed by Russians,"
ZMINA, 2022]
18
В. Червоненко, “Патріарх Кирило благословив війська РФ на війну проти України. Як це сталось,” BBC
News Україна, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/news-60720034. [V. Chervonenko, "Patriarch Kyrylo
17
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Consequently, the position of any such organization in Ukraine must be different from the
position of the aggressor. Against this background, despite the assurance of abstracting the
religious plane from the political plane, a significant part of Ukrainian society is naturally
dissatisfied with the legitimate functioning of the subordinate organization from which the war
criminals came. This situation also cannot be ignored by the leadership of the UOC-MP, as it
has been since 2014.
Table 1 shows data on the independent transition of more than 400 parishes of the UOCMP to the OCU. Despite the accusations which mentioned “forcible seizures” of churches and
forced transfers of parishes to the OCU, there are objective arguments that could probably
induce the majority of parishes to take such a step. Visual observation of all the criminal actions
that the Russian army is committing in Ukraine makes people reconsider their own worldview
and attitude towards everything Russian, the church in particular. But, even in the religious
area, the so-called “friendly fire” is tendentiously claimed, when Russian artillery shelled the
parishes of the UOC-MP (see Table 2). According to the State Service of Ukraine for
Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience, during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, “at least 28
buildings of spiritual significance have already been damaged,” 19 some of which are parishes
subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchate. However, even such actions of the Russian army in
Ukraine do not motivate the leadership of the UOC-MP to organize a religious denomination
truly independent from Russian influence.

Table 2. Separate facts of the destruction by the Russian army of churches in
Ukraine subordinate to the UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate19
1

St. George's Church, built in 1873, is subordinate
to the UOC-MP

3

The All-Saints Skete of the
Svyatogorsk Lavra is
subordinate to the UOC-MP

blessed the troops of the Russian Federation for the war against Ukraine. How it happened," BBC News Ukraine,
2022,]
19
“Російське вторгнення несе руйнування церквам, мечетям, синагогам і релігійним освітнім закладам у
різних регіонах України,” Державна служба України з етнополітики та свободи совісті, 2022,
https://dess.gov.ua/rosiyske-vtorhnennia-nese-ruynuvannia-tserkvam/. ["Russian invasion brings destruction to
churches, mosques, synagogues and religious educational institutions in different regions of Ukraine," State
Service of Ukraine for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience, 2022,]
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2

The 160-year-old wooden Church of the Nativity

4

The Church of the Holy

of the Blessed Virgin Mary is subordinate to the

Blessed Queen Tamara is

UOC-MP

subordinate to the UOC-MP

For clarity, Table 2 illustrates only a few photographs with church buildings that are
subordinate to the UOC-MP. This makes it difficult for conscious Ukrainians to respect any
Russian influence in the field of religion. The formalized approach to the issues of organizing
the independence of the UOC from the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian ideology
destructive for the Ukrainian statehood testifies to the bias of this organization. Despite all the
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apparent contradictions that are contained in the media, there is a list of positive aspects that
should be highlighted in the departure of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Moscow
Patriarchate:
1. The decisive separation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the influence of the
religious ideology of Moscow has become a clear indication that the Ukrainian nation has
managed to form as a separate people and can independently act in matters of religious choice.
2. In a short time, she completely abandoned the destructive ideological influence of
the Kremlin, having shown total resistance to the violation of the commandment “Thou shalt
not kill.” In this context, it appears that Moscow blesses murder, while Kyiv asks God to protect
the Ukrainian people. All this takes place in plain sight.
3. While the Moscow Patriarchate has become a symbol of religious terror and an
instrument that blesses violence, the refusal of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church has helped
decisively preserve the Ukrainian Church’s worthy reputation.
4. Before the start of a full-scale war in Ukraine, the parishioners of the Ukrainian
Moscow Patriarchate did not pay attention to the church's belonging to Moscow; it gained
significance after the start of the war.
5. The decisive refusal of and withdrawal from the Moscow Patriarchate reduced the
risks of a split in the Ukrainian nation based on religious beliefs. At the same time, it helped to
neutralize the destructive ideological influence of the Moscow Patriarchate on society through
the media.
7. In the future, injecting funds into the development of only one Ukrainian Orthodox
Church will help strengthen the status of the Orthodox denomination in society, provided that
victory is on the side of Ukraine.
8. The move strengthened the national and religious spirit due to the increased interest
in religious life on the part of the President's office.
9. The Armed Forces of Ukraine are supported by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church
through the help and care of the soldiers of military chaplains, priests and monks.
10. The split allowed the residual return of jurisdiction over the national monuments of
Ukraine, which, until then, were subordinate and belonged to the Moscow Patriarchate, since
they were leased to the Kremlin for life.
Conclusions
In a preliminary study of the non-religious influence of the UOC-MP in Ukraine, it was
found that the activity of this denomination “needs a thorough review in order to eliminate
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contradictions related to state interests.” Since that time, legislative changes have taken place
in Ukraine aimed at depriving Russia of internal levers of ideological influence on Ukrainian
society. As the last 30 years of Ukraine's independence show, such initiatives should have been
implemented with the beginning of gaining independence but were not. After all, the difficult
situation which Ukraine now faces is, in part, the result of the active work within the country
of the so-called “fifth column.” One of the weighty planes of Russian destructive influence on
Ukrainian society remains the UOC-MP, which by all indications used to be characterized as a
branch of the ROC in Ukraine. This organization had a lot of time to remove the reasons of
distrust on the part of Ukrainian society. However, the Decree of the Council of the UOC (MP)
dated May 27, 2022, does not demonstrate a sincere desire to be a socially useful church that
contributes to the improvement of Ukraine. This approach to the removing the subordination
to the Moscow Patriarchate is formalized by a combination of factors and does not change the
negative essence of the Russian ideology, which, among other things, is actively spreading in
Ukraine via the UOC-MP. Under such conditions, the prohibition of the activities of the UOCMP on the territory of a belligerent state remains likely.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (SEPTEMBER 2022) XLII, 7

36

Published Sources
BBC News Україна. “З моменту вторгнення Росії УПЦ МП покинули понад 400
парафій. BBC News Україна,” 2022. https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/news-61549903. [BBC
News Ukraine. "Since the invasion of Russia, more than 400 parishes have left the UOC-MP.
BBC News Ukraine," 2022.]
Beggs, C. “Soft Power, Hard Times: Russian Influence in the Post-Soviet Space during
Periods of Military Conflict.” A dissertation submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
2021.
Ohle, M., R. Cook, S. Jovanović, and Z. Han. “Russia’s Architecture of Hegemony.” :
Christian Orthodox Subordination Strategies in Russia’s Peripheral Zone. Europe-Asia
Studies 74, no. 3 (2022): 382–401.
Synchak, B., M. Balaklytskyi, and V. Dudarets. “Non-Religious Influence of the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate on Ukrainian Society.” Occasional
Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe 42, no. 4 (2022): 47–60.
ZMINA. “За сто днів повномасштабної війни в Україні правоохоронці
зафіксували понад 22,5 тисячі злочинів, які вчинили росіяни,” 2022.
https://zmina.info/news/za-sto-dniv-povnomasshtabnoyi-vijny-v-ukrayini-pravoohoronczizafiksuvaly-majzhe-23-tysyachi-zlochyniv-yaki-vchynyly-rosiyany/. [ZMINA. "For one
hundred days of full-scale war in Ukraine, law enforcement officers recorded more than 22,500
crimes committed by Russians," 2022.]
Верховна Рада України. “Проект Закону про внесення змін до деяких законів
України щодо підтримки національного музичного продукту та обмеження публічного
використання музичного продукту держави-агресора 7273-д від 29.05.2022,” 2022.
https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/39702. [Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. "Draft of the
Law on Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine Regarding Support of the National Musical
Product and Limitation of Public Use of the Musical Product of the Aggressor State 7273-d
dated May 29, 2022," 2022.]
Верховна Рада України. “Проект Закону про внесення змін до деяких
законодавчих актів України щодо заборони політичних партій,” 2022.
https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/39307. [Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. "Draft of the
Law on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine Regarding the Prohibition of
Political Parties,"]
Гордієнко, М. “Причини непереходу вірян УПЦ (МП) до ПЦУ.” Кваліфікаційна
робота бакалавра, наук, 2021. [Gordienko, M. "Reasons for non-transfer of believers of the
UOC (MP) to the OCU." Qualifying thesis of a bachelor of science, 2021.]
Державна служба України з етнополітики та свободи совісті. “Російське
вторгнення несе руйнування церквам, мечетям, синагогам і релігійним освітнім
закладам у різних регіонах України,” 2022. https://dess.gov.ua/rosiyske-vtorhnennia-neseruynuvannia-tserkvam/. [State Service of Ukraine for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of
Conscience. "Russian invasion brings destruction to churches, mosques, synagogues and
religious educational institutions in various regions of Ukraine," 2022.]
Кагамлик, С. “Церква в Україні в умовах сучасних загроз: реакція на Російську
військову агресію.” Українознавчий альманах, no. 29 (2021): 82. [Kahamlyk, S. "Church in
Ukraine under conditions of modern threats: reaction to Russian military aggression."
Ukrainian Studies Almanac, no. 29 (2021): 82.]
Київська міська рада. “Понад 6,5 мільйонів голосів громадяни України віддали в
рейтинговому електронному голосуванні щодо перейменувань міських об’єктів, назви
яких
пов’язані
з
російською
федерацією
та
її
сателітами,”
2022.
https://kmr.gov.ua/uk/content/ponad-65-milyoniv-golosiv-gromadyany-ukrayiny-viddaly-v-

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (SEPTEMBER 2022) XLII, 7

37

reytyngovomu-elektronnomu. [Kyiv City Council. "Over 6.5 million votes were cast by the
citizens of Ukraine in a ranked electronic vote on the renaming of city objects, the names of
which are associated with the Russian Federation and its satellites," 2022.]
Киридон, Алла. “Релігійно-конфесійна ідентичність: динаміка процесів у
православному просторі України (2018-2021).” In Актуальні проблеми сучасної
філософії та науки: виклики сьогодення, 33–39. Житомир: Видавець О.О. Євенок, 2021.
[Kyridon, Alla. "Religious-denominational identity: dynamics of processes in the Orthodox
space of Ukraine (2018-2021)." In Current problems of modern philosophy and science:
challenges of today, 33–39. Zhytomyr: Publisher O.O. Evenok, 2021.]
Радіо Свобода. “В Україні заборонили вже 10 проросійських партій, на черзі є ще
сім – Мін’юст,” 2022. https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-ukraina-zaborona-10prorosiiski-partii/31908143.html. [Radio Svoboda. "10 pro-Russian parties have already been
banned in Ukraine, seven more are on the way - Ministry of Justice," 2022.]
Релігійна правда. “Косметичні зміни. З’явився текст нового статуту УПЦ МП,”
2022. https://religionpravda.com.ua/?p=82497. [Religious truth. "Cosmetic changes. The text
of the new statute of the UOC MP, 2022 has appeared.]
Соляр, І., and О. Красівський. “Трансформація державно-церковних відносин в
Україні (1989 – 2021).” Izdevnieciba Baltija Publishing, 2021, 52–84. doi:10.30525/9789934-26-211-1-3. [Solyar, I., and O. Krasivskyi. "Transformation of state-church relations in
Ukraine (1989 - 2021)."]
Українська Православна Церква. “Постанова Собору Української Православної
Церкви від 27 травня 2022 року,” 2022. https://news.church.ua/2022/05/27/postanovasoboru-ukrajinskoji-pravoslavnoji-cerkvi-vid-27-travnya-2022-roku. [Ukrainian Orthodox
Church. "Resolution of the Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church dated May 27, 2022,"
2022.]
Червоненко, В. “Патріарх Кирило благословив війська РФ на війну проти
України. Як це сталось.” BBC News Україна, 2022. https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/news60720034. [Chervonenko, V. "Patriarch Kyrylo blessed the troops of the Russian Federation
for the war against Ukraine. How did it happen." BBC News Ukraine, 2022.]
Kilp, Alar and Pankhurst, Jerry G. (2022) "Soft, Sharp, and Evil Power: The Russian
Orthodox Church in the Russian Invasion of Ukraine," Occasional Papers on Religion in
Eastern Europe: Vol. 42: Iss. 5, Article 2.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (SEPTEMBER 2022) XLII, 7

38

